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Firm Heterogeneity, Informal Wage and Good Governance 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
We provide an analysis of enforcement policies in a framework with heterogeneous 
firms, endogenous determination of informal wage and politically dictated strategies. We 
argue that firms which operate both in the formal and informal sectors do very little to 
increase TOTAL employment when faced with the opportunity of hiring workers in the 
informal labor market. Thus enforcing labor laws and other regulations in this case 
should not have aggregate employment effects. For firms operating exclusively in the 
informal sector, the outcome is different. Such features determine the stringency of 
enforcement in the context of markets characterized by firms with varying levels of 
productivity. For example if the formal sector has firms with relatively high levels of 
productivity enforcement has to be stricter than in the case with relatively large number 
of low productive firms. This seems to be consistent with observed behavior of the 
authorities in the developed and the developing world. We also talk about the 
implications of labor market reforms on informal wage. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Informal or unorganized labor markets absorb most of the workforce in the 
developing world. While workers employed in organized, the formal segment of the labor 
market are expected to have trade union rights, claims on government recognized wage 
and other benefits, informal workers do not typically get such benefits and are for more 
exposed to day to day fluctuations of labor markets. A simple characterization of such 
segmented markets, that is generally accepted, runs in terms of the difference in the wage 
rates. Formal sector workers typically enjoy higher wage than their formal counter part. 
Recent literature on informal labor market has focused on the impact of liberal 
economic policies on informal wage and employment. Marjit (2003), Goldberg and 
Pavcnik (2003), Marjit, Ghosh and Biswas (2007), Marjit, Kar and Beladi (2007) etc. 
have discussed the impact of trade policies on the size of the informal sector. In a 
different context Dasgupta and Marjit (2006), Marjit, Mukherjee and Kolmar (2006) have 
analyzed the political reasons as the part of the state to promote and perpetuate the 
“informal” labor market even if such markets undermine the legal jurisdictions. A poor 
country can choose to look away from the ‘informal’ sector because it provides “social 
security” for the poor and prevents political unrest. These views hold under the 
presumption that having an informal i.e. a low wage labor market helps “employment” 
situation and the poor. 
In a recent paper Kanbur (2009) raises various issues regarding enforcement and 
informal sector. One particular concern seems to be the applicability of regulations 
because one may design thousands of regulations but most of them can be operationally 
infeasible. Also in a typical developing country it is not easy to rule with an iron hand. 
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This paper seems to follow the lead provided by Kanbur (2009) and tries to provide a 
somewhat rigorous analysis of optimal design of a relevant policy.       
The specific purpose of this paper is to show, in terms of a simple framework, that 
existence of informal sector may not necessarily increase employment relative to 
situation when there is no such sector. In other words a change in the informal wage may 
not affect aggregate employment when firms employ both formal and informal workers. 
Employment effects of changes in informal wage will depend critically on the 
distribution of firms along the productivity spectrum. Degree of heterogeneity of firms 
matters in determining the aggregate effects of employment.1 
From a political economic angle our analysis has some new insights to offer. 
Since more productive firms will not increase the total demand for labor if faced with the 
opportunity to access informal labor market, political authorities in a democracy will be 
more inclined to enforce regulations in industries or markets where we observe mostly 
good firms.   
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section we develop the model 
and discuss the employment effects. The third section looks at the determination of 
informal wage. The fourth discusses political economic aspect of the problem. The last 
section concludes. 
 
2. Equilibrium in Segmented Labor Market 
 
Consider an economy with firms having a choice of hiring two kinds of labor, 
formal and informal at  predetermined wage rates w1 > w2  , w1 being the wage paid to the 
                                                 
1
 Firm heterogeneity has played a key role in contemporary trade theoretic work. For example refer to 
Melitz (2003), Antras (2003), Helpman (2006) etc. 
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formal workers and w2 is paid to the informal workers. Firms are distributed in a 
continuum indexed by [ ]1,0, ∈ZZ  
Production functions are given by  
 
( ) ( )iLfZF θ= ,  2,1=i                                    (1) 
With ( ) ( ) ( ) θθθθθ ==>′ 1,0,0Z  and ( ) 00,0,0 =<′′>′ fff  
Thus firms higher up in the ladder are more productive. 
Formal activities are conducted in a legal environment. Informal labor, if hired, will 
constitute as an extra legal activity. If audited and apprehended firms will have to pay a 
fine S (or a bribe to get out of the mess!). 
Compensating the benefit derived from lower wage, we assume a convex  penalty 
function.2 
( ) 0,0,2 >′′>′= SSLSS                                                    (2) 
The auditing probability is assumed to be 0<q<1. 
Hence, the profit function of the Zth firm will be given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )222211121 ,, LqSLwLfZLwLfZLLZ −−+−= θθpi               (3) 
0,0
21
=
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
LL
pipi
 imply 
                       
( ) ( ) 11 wLfZ =′θ                                 (4) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )222 LSqwLfZ ′+=′θ                (5) 
 
for determining L1, L2     
Equating marginal with 
( )221 LSqww ′+=                              (6) 
                                                 
2
 For more detailed discussion on this, refer to Marjit, Ghosh and Biswas (2007). 
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Let   2
~L  solve (6). 
2
~L ( )qww ,2,1φ=                                 (7) 
(7) implies that for L > 2
~L   hiring informal workers will be more expensive on the 
margin. Therefore, if the firm decides to hire L  number of workers and L > 2
~L ,then 
( )2~LL − will be hired in the formal sector. If  2~LL ≤ ,informal workers will be cheaper to 
hire. 
Now from (4) 
                                                   ( )( )11 , wZL θϕ=                              (8) 
It is easy to show that 01 >
∂
∂
Z
L
 as, 0>′θ and .0<′′f  
Let us solve for Z~ such that  
2
~L ( )( )1,~ wZθϕ=                                                        (9) 
From (8) and (9)  following lemmas  are immediate. 
 
Lemma1: >∀Z Z~ , ( )( )21 ~LZL − will be the extent of employment in the formal sector. 
 
Proof: ( ) 0,~~ 121 >∂∂= ZLLZL  and >∀Z Z~  
Therefore, ( ) 122 wLSqw >′+               (QED) 
 
Lemma2: ,~ZZ ≤∀ firms will not operate in the formal sector. 
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Proof: ,~ZZ ≤∀ ( ) 122 wLSqw <′+     
 
So far we have been silent on the distribution of firms. Let us assume that ( )Zη represents 
the density function with 1)(
1
0
=∫ dZZη  
From Lemmas 1 and 2, aggregate employment is given by, 
( )dZZLLE
Z
∫=
1
~
2
~ η  ( )( ) ( ) +−+ ∫ dZZLZL
Z
η
1
~
21
~
∫
Z
dZZZL
~
0
2 )()( η                    (10) 
relatively productive firms [ ]ZZ ~≥  hire both formal and informal workers. Firms with 
lower productivities ( )ZZ ~≤  hire only informal workers. 
 
Proposition 1: If ( ) ZZZ ~0 ≤∀=η  and ( ) 1
1
~
=∫ dZZ
Z
η , then LE is independent of 2w . 
Proof: Note that 2
~L depends only on 1w , 2w  and q [from(7)]. Here we are considering a 
situation where all firms are distributed beyond the threshold productivity Z~ .  From 
Lemma 1 and 2 we know  
( ) ( )( ) ( )dZZwZdZZLLE
ZZ
ηθϕη ∫∫ ==
1
~
1
1
~
1 ,  
Which is independent of  2w .    (QED) 
Following observations are in order. 
First, Proposition 1 implies no matter whatever be the change in aggregate 
employment of relatively productive firms will not change. 
Second, composition of employment will change as 2
~L  does respond to 2w . 
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Employment in the formal sector is given by  
                                           
( )( ) ( )dZZLZLL
Z
F η∫ −=
1
~
21
~
                             (11) 
It is straightforward to argue that a fall in 2w  will reduce employment in the formal sector 
by increasing Z~ . 
3. Determination of 2w  
 
Suppose aggregate labor force is given by L .  People look for jobs in the informal 
sector if they do not find a job in the formal sector as 21 ww > .3 Therefore effective 
supply of labor in the informal sector is given by 
F
S
I LLL −=                       (12) 
Recall that Z~  is defined by 
        ( ) ( ) 12~~ wLfZ =′θ                       (13) 
Now,   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Z
dw
ZdLdZZ
dw
dL
dw
ZdZZL
dw
dL
Z
F ~
~
~
~
~~
2
2
1
~2
2
2
2
1
2
ηηη +−−= ∫  
Also ( ) =ZL ~1 2~L  
Therefore, ( ) 0
~ 1
~2
2
2
>
∂
∂
−= ∫
Z
F dZZ
w
L
dw
dL η                             (14) 
( )∫ <=
1
~2
2
2
0
~
Z
S
I dZZ
dw
Ld
dw
dL η                                                   (15) 
If the informal wage goes up, firms switch to formal employment and more firms 
                                                 
3
 1w is assumed to be given through negotiations with the trade unions, a feature of the organized labor 
market. Endogenous 2w  must be lower than 1w , otherwise everyone will go for informal job. While there 
is no explicit mechanism by which 1w  adjusts under such circumstances, we assume away such 
possibilities for focusing on our main interest. 
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hire both informal and formal workers. Thus total employment in the formal sector goes 
up. The residual number of job seekers in the formal sector goes down. Thus the labor 
supply function has a negative relation with 2w . 
In the literature Agenor and Montiel (1996), Marjit (2003) and others have argued 
with such models. One can explicitly solve for 1w  by constructing Union’s objective 
function and make sure that 21 ww > . 
Let 2~w be defined such that  
( ) 2222 ~~ LwLL ==                                                    (16)  
Where ( ) 12 wLf =′θ  
Hence for ,~22 ww ≤ .0=FL  
In this case   LLSI =  
Suppose 12 ww ≥ then all firms will hire formal workers and formal sector employment 
will hit the maximum level say FL . 
We assume 
                       FLL >                                   (17) 
(17) suggests that even maximum level of formal sector employment will not be able to 
exhaust entire labor supply. SIL  looks like the following. 
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Aggregate demand for informal labor will decline as w2 moves up. Let us denote the 
aggregate demand as DIL . 
0=DIL  for 12 ww ≥ .  
This is obvious from (6). 
It is also straightforward to argue that DIL  will continue to in wax with decline in 2w . Let 
the following be true. 
Lim  ( ) LwLDI
w
〉
→
202
lim  
(18) guarantees that for a low enough 2w aggregate informal employment can exhaust the 
entire supply of labor. This will ensure a positive equilibrium 2w . 
Given the nature of demand and supply function, we can infer the following. Let *2w  be 
the equilibrium wage. 
 
Proposition 2: Two possible equilibria will emerge: either 〉1w
*
2w 2
~w〉  or, *2w 2
~w≤ . 
2w
1w
2
~w
1S
2S
3S
4S
FLL − L
S
IL
Figure1 
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Proof: First note that an equilibrium always exists. 
Given (18) holds such *2w∃  such ( ) LwLDI 〉*2 . 
Also ( ) 




≤≥
*
21
*
2 wLwwL
S
I
D
I  
Given continuity of DIL , 
*
2w∃  such that SIDI LL =  
This also shows that the equilibrium wage *2w  has to be less than 1w . But 
*
2w  can be less 
than 2~w .                  (QED) 
 
Figure 2 depicts the equilibrium. 
 
 
As figure2 suggests both A and B are stable equilibrium. From the definition of 2~w ,at A, 
there will be some employment in the formal sector. At B there will be no formal sector 
employment. Also note that both A and B are Walrasian stable equilibrium. 
 
Figure 2 
2w
1w
D
S
A
1D
2DL
B
S
2
~w
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4. Theory and Policy Issues 
 
In this section we are going to discuss two specific policies one discussed in 
public forum and other never discussed in public but has profound political implications. 
(a) Labor Market Reform 
If hiring and firing is costly, if exiting form industry is difficult, that may hurt 
employment in the formal sector. That is the reason labor market reform policies are 
prescribed for the developing countries. But such policies are undertaken with respect to 
the formal sector. If one reduces effective wage cost in the formal sector, it will have 
some impact on the informal wage, an indicator of the purchasing power of millions of 
the poor people. 
In our set up developed so far changes in 1w  will affect both demand and supply in the 
informal sector. Consider an initial equilibrium *2w .  To show what happens to 
*
2w  
subsequent to a change in 1w  we need to check the impact on 
D
IL  relative to
S
IL . 
Let us look at the impact on the supply side first. 
From (11) we know 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∫∫ −=
1
~
2
1
~
1
~
ZZ
F dZZZLdZZZLL ηη  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
1
1
1
~
2
1
2
1
1
1
~~~
~
~
~
~~
dw
dLZZLZ
dw
ZdLdZZ
dw
Ld
dw
dZZZL
dw
dL
Z
F ηηηη ++−−= ∫  
           = ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
1
1
~1
2 ~~
~
dw
dL
ZZLdZZ
dw
Ld
Z
ηη +− ∫                               (19) 
From (5) and the fact that 0
~
,0
1
2 〉〉′′
dw
LdS  and 0
1
1 〈
dw
dL
. 
Therefore, 
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( ) ( )dZZ
dw
dLdZZ
dw
Ld
dw
dL
ZZw
S
I ∫∫ −==
1
~ 1
1
1
~1
2
*1
~
ηη                      (20) 
If w1 goes up, formal sector employment shrinks leading to a rise in informal sector labor 
supply.  If labor reform pushes 1w  down, 
S
IL will shift inward. 
Now, ( ) ( ) ( )dZZLdZZZLL
Z
Z
D
I ∫∫ +=
1
~
2
~
0
2
~ ηη  
          ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )dZZ
dw
Ld
dw
ZdZL
dw
ZdZZLdZZ
dw
dL
dw
dL
Z
ZD
I ηηηη ∫∫ ++−=
1
~ 1
2
1
2
1
2
~
0 1
2
1
~~
~~
~
~~
 
         
                   = ( )dZZ
dw
Ld
Z
η∫
1
~ 1
2
~
                                           (21) 
Therefore combining (20) and (21) we get, 
1dw
dLDI
- 
1dw
dLSI
= ( )dZZ
dw
dL
Z
η∫
1
~ 1
1
                                           (22) 
            Since 
1
1
dw
dL 0〈 , ( ) 0
1
〈
dw
EDd I
   where IED
S
I
D
I LL −≡ . 
 
Proposition 3: Since informal labor market is Walrasian stable, labor market reform will 
improve informal wage. 
Proof:  A decline in hiring and firing cost of the organized sector labor i.e. 1w will increase 
excess demand for labor in the informal labor market as ( ) 0
1
〈
dw
EDd I
 
(from (22)). By Walrasian stability ( ) 0
*
2
〈
dw
EDd I
. 
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Hence *2w  must rise.      (QED) 
 
(b)  Political Economy of Informal Sector 
Informal labor market provides employment to a vast pool of workers who would     
never find a job in the so called organized formal sector. In many ways this acts as a 
cushion for poor people in the developing countries. But the activities which employ 
informal workers tend to be outside the domain of legal boundary. These transactions can 
be unrecorded, unregistered and overall extra legal. 
 
If the state has to preserve the sanctity of legal institutions, and rules of law, strictly 
speaking it becomes difficult to ignore informality completely and shy away from extra 
legal activities. On the other hand poor countries have to care for employment and 
income earning capacity of the huge of unskilled population. 
In our framework q represents an index of the monitoring intensity or stringency 
of the legal structure in place. Higher q affects informal wage by restricting demand. If 
the government cares about aggregate employment as well as the importance of the legal 
institution, one may propose the following objective function of the state. 
( ) ( )qCEq −Ω=Ω ,                                      (23) 
with .0,0,0,0,0,0,0 2112221121 〉′′〉′=Ω=Ω〈Ω〈Ω〉Ω〉Ω CC , where ( )qC denotes cost of 
preserving law or rules of law and regulatory framework. 
  Note that the objective of the government is related to those one used in Marjit, 
Kolmar and Mukherjee (2006).But in the latter there explicit role and working of the 
informal labor market was not introduced. In Marcoullier and Young (1995) a Leviathon 
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State allowed informal activities or corruption to sustain itself for material gains.But ours 
is drawn from a more welfarist perspective. 
Aggregate employment E is defined as 
E ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )∫∫∫ −++≡
1
~
21
1
~
2
~
0
2
~~
ZZ
Z
dZZLZLdZZLdZZZL ηηη  
       = ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∫∫ +
1
~
1
~
0
2
Z
Z
dZZZLdZZZL ηη                             (24) 
One way to classify societies is to do it according to the distribution of firms. 
First note that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )dZZ
q
ZL
dq
ZdZZLdZZ
q
ZL
dq
ZdZZL
dq
dE
Z
z
ηηηη ∫∫ ∂
∂
+−
∂
∂
+=
1
~
1
1
~
0
2
2
~
~
~
~~
       (25) 
As discussed earlier (from (4)) q does not affect ( )ZL1  . The only term that is relevant 
is given by 
=
dq
dE
 
( ) ( )dZZ
q
ZLz η∫ ∂
∂~
0
2
                                                  (26) 
            with ( ) 02 〈∂
dq
ZL
. 
            From (26) let us define an implicit function 
   ( ) 0, 〈′= EqEE                                                                 (27) 
Therefore, from (22) and (26) we get 
( )( ) ( )qCqEq −Ω=Ω ,                                                      (28) 
)29(
00
21
21
EC
CE
dq
d
′Ω−′=Ω⇒
=′−′Ω+Ω⇒=Ω
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Note that the LHS represents the marginal benefit from upholding the sanctity of legal 
institutions, rules of law, punishing the illegal and extra legal. Right hand side represents 
the direct cost of monitoring and the indirect cost in terms of a reduction in employment 
in the informal sector. 
Let *q solve (29)4. Economies may be classified in terms of quality of firms those 
operate in the economy. Think of a situation where all firms operate in the formal sector 
with ( ) 0=Zη ZZ ~〈∀ and ( ) 0〉Zη  for ZZ ~≥  .We know that 0=′E  in that situation. This 
will imply a higher *q compared to where there are firms operating only in the informal 
sector. Since more productive firms do not change their level of employment following 
changes in q, the government should not have the incentive to protect the extra legal 
sector because the marginal cost of implementing higher levels of q  is relatively low, on 
the other hand there are firms which are operating only in the informal sector, higher q  
has an additional cost.  It lowers the level of employment. 
Firms which operate in formal as well as in the informal sector tend to substitute one 
type of employment with the other. If q goes up, they will substitute informal 
employment with formal employment and that helps good governance. It discourages 
informal activities without much of an impact on aggregate employment. Thus if either 
through a growth in labor productivity or through any set of factors that shift the labor 
demand curve, the need for pampering informal sector gradually declines. That is why in 
the developed countries need to be productive about the informal segment is not there, 
because the employment effect of bad governance is not so significant.  
  
                                                 
4
 SOC is satisfied provided EEC ′′Ω〉′Ω+′′−Ω 22211  
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